

A Changing Risk Environment Requires Extraordinary Action

A Bulk Power System Reliability Perspective

John Moura, Director - Reliability Assessment and Performance Analysis MGA MID-GRID 2035 2.0 Quarterly Meeting September 28, 2023

**RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY** 



1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

Coal and Oil

Nuclear

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### **Across an Interconnected System:** Less Resources Means More Reliance on Neighbors

2025 Risk Areas

# 2012 and 2022 Peak Capacity Resource Mix NERC-Wide

#### 1.2% MRO MRO WECC WECC 4% Decrease SaskPower Manitoba Hydro 10.6% 1.7% 3% 10% NPCC Quebec 14.4% 13% WECC 37.9% NPCC 45% New England NPCC New York High Risk WECC WECC Elevated Risk CA/MX 34.2% SERC 22% Texas R SERC High Risk: shortfalls may occur at normal peak conditions Elevated Risk: shortfalls may occur in extreme condition 2012 On-Peak 2022 On-Peak Natural Gas Total Hydro Solar PV and Other Wind





# Recent Examples Highlight Need for Wide-Area Energy Assessments

# **ERCOT, SPP, MISO:** A "wind drought" caused 60 GW of installed wind capacity to generate 300 MW



Net Scheduled Export Interchange\* (MWh, Thousands)



**PJM:** Transmission system during extreme cold weather limited the ability to export to support southern neighbors

**RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY** 



## Hours Without Operator-Initiated Firm Load Shed (%/year)





Winter Storm Elliot Wide-Area Inquiry Nearing Completion: Preliminary Results

# **Similarities to Past Extreme Cold Weather Events**

	2011 Event	2014 Event	2018 Event	2021 Event	2022 Event
Significant levels of incremental unplanned electric generating unit losses with top causes found to be mechanical/electrical, freezing, and fuel issues.	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	<b>~</b>	<b>~</b>	<b>√</b>
Significant natural gas production decreases occurred, with some areas of the country more severely affected.	<b>√</b>			<b>√</b>	1
Short-range forecasts of peak electricity demands were less than actual demands for some BAs in event area	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>		<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>



### Long-Term Challenges Emerge

### How are we going to integrate...







without more of this....







https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/Major-Event-Reports.aspx



### **Hyper Complex Risk Environment**



#### **Rapidly Changing Resource Mix**

- Retirements of traditional generation
- Natural gas interdependencies
- Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) integration
- DER performance and visibility



Energy & Environmental Policy

- Electrification
- Emissions
- Transmission
  - 8



#### Extreme Weather Complexities

- Extreme not infrequent
- Broader deeper longer



Rapidly Evolving Threat Landscape

- S/W vulnerabilities
- Supply chain
- Ransomware
- Physical attacks



### Hyper Complex Risk Environment Results in Increased BPS Reliability Risk



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Energy & Environmental Policy

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#### Rapidly Evolving Threat Landscape

- S/W vulnerabilities
- Supply chain
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#### Fuel assurance/uncertainties

- Natural gas
- Renewables

#### Loss of key "essential reliability services" with retirements

- Inertia/frequency response
- Reactive Power/voltage support
- Dispatchability

#### Appropriate level of investment in infrastructure for hardening & resilience

- Extreme weather
- Coordinated Physical attack
- Insufficient transfers

# Expanding cyber attack surface

- Industry Control Systems (ICSs)
- IBRs/DERs/EV Charging

# Sophistication of recent cyber attacks

- SolarWinds (one to many)
- Pipedream, Industroyer malware

#### **RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY**



- Known generator retirements totaling over 110 GW
- New and proposed U.S. EPA regulations are expected to further accelerate retirements
- 2023 Long-Term Reliability Assessment will consider updated retirement information and scenarios for assessing future resource adequacy and reliability risks





# Peak Demand and Energy: Electrification Growth Across North America

- 10-year Peak Demand and Energy growth showed largest increases in years
  - Further increases from electrification and EV adoption are anticipated
- Peak demand growth is accelerating
- Growth in some areas is affecting adequacy of reserves and seasonal energy risks



#### 2022 LTRA 10-year Summer and Winter Peak Demand Growth

Largest 10-year Winter Peak Demand Growth		Largest 10-year Summer Peak Demand Growth			
Assessment Area	Demand Change	Assessment Area	Demand Change		
NPCC-New York	2.36%	WECC-SRSG	1.69%		
WECC-SRSG	2.06%	NPCC-Ontario	1.27%		
NPCC-New England	1.95%	WECC-CAMX	1.19%		
NPCC-Ontario	1.32%	MRO-SaskPower	1.05%		
Texas RE-ERCOT	1.30%	NPCC-Maritimes	1.03%		





development, internal operational processes





### **Reliability Risk Mitigation Toolkit**



### Reliability Guideline

Suggested approaches or behavior in a given technical area for the purpose of improving reliability. Guidelines are not enforceable, but may be adopted by a responsible entity in accordance with its own policies, practices, and conditions.



NERC alerts are divided into three distinct levels, 1) Industry Advisory, 2) Recommendation to Industry, and 3) Essential Action, which identifies actions to be taken and require the industry to respond to the ERO.

### Technical Engagem<u>ent</u>

Technical Engagement is a catch-all for a variety of technical activity that is conducted between the ERO and entities. This includes, technical committee activities, technical reference documents, workshops and conferences, assist visits, joint and special studies, etc.

### Electric Reliability Organization: Reliability Risk Mitigation Toolkit



### Reliability Standards



NERC Reliability Standards define the mandatory reliability requirements for planning and operating the North American BPS and are developed using a resultsbased approach focusing on performance, risk management, and entity capabilities.

### Reliability Assessment



NERC independently assesses and reports on the overall reliability, adequacy, and associated risks that could impact BPS reliability. Long-term assessments identify emerging reliability issues that support public policy input, improved planning and operations, and general public awareness.

### NERC Alert: Level 1



NERC Alerts are divided into three distinct levels, 1) Industry Advisory, 2) Recommendation to Industry, and 3) Essential Action, which identifies actions to be taken and require the industry to respond to the ERO.



# A Changing Context for the BPS



#### Must Wins:

- 1. Manage the pace of transformation through market mechanisms and inter-agency coordination on policies that impact generation
- 2. Develop sufficient **transmission**, to integrate renewables and distribute them, make the system more resilient
- 3. Maintain a robust fleet of **balancing resources**, with an ability to provide **Essential Reliability Services**
- 4. Ensure a robust **energy supply chain** for the balancing resources, with sufficient access to fuel and stored energy to withstand long-duration, wide-spread extreme weather events
- 5. STATES: Refine resource adequacy requirements that preserves energy assurance





# **Questions and Answers**

